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CASE NO. 16268

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Plaintiff and Appellant, Charles N. Bennett, hereinafter referred to as HUSBAND, herein petitions this Honorable Court

for a rehearing on the Judgment rendered by the

Supreme

Court

wherein

this

of

the State of Utah on October 19,

Honorable

Court

affirmed

the

1979,

Judgment of a

lower District Court.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision and findings
of

the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the instant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

action,

by

October 19,

reason
1979,

of

wherein

the

opinion

by

it

affirmed

the

this

Court

Judgment

on

of the

lower Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IN DIVISION OF ASSETS THE COURT CAN CONSIDER ONLY
SUCH ASSETS AS ARE VESTED IN THE APPELLANT AND
CANNOT CONS IDER FUTURE RETIREMENT FUNDS THAT MAY
BE PA ID TO APPELLANT AS RET IREr.fENT FUNDS WHICH ARE
CONTINGENT, SPECULATIVE AND UNKNOWN.
The issue which was submitted in the previous Brief of
the

Appellant

to

this Honorable Court,

contained an

which has never been decided by the Court,

issue

and which is a

matter of great substance and import, and was not considered
by this Honorable Court in the rendering of the decision and
findings

of

This

the Court

Court

issue before

the

stated
trial

in

its opinion of October 19,

in Paragraph 1 of

1979.

its Opinion,

Court was whether or not

the

the Court

could take into consideration an accumulated retirement fund
of about $15,000.00 which would not be payable to the Plaintiff until he retires,

the Appellant presently being of the

age of 49 years.
It

is submitted to this Honorable Court that the issue

before the Court was not as to whether or not the $15,000.00
which had been earned and accumulated as retirement funds by
the Appellant could be used in considering an equitable distribution of the property of the parties, in that the Appel-
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lant

had never

fically admits
earned could
taken

into

raised
that

that

the

issue

to

the Court,

and speci-

$15,681.95 which the Appellant had

and was properly considered by the Judge and

consideration

in determining the assets of the

marital estate.
The

issue before the Court was not whether or not

the

original $15,000.00 which had been accumulated and was payable to the Plaintiff could be considered by the Court as an
asset, but whether or not a sum of an additional $15,000.00
which had not been accumulated and not accrued by the Appellant and which could never vest in the Appellant nor be considered as funds additional

to the original $15,000.00, but

is only a bookkeeping process of the Federal Government in
its setting up of a retirement

fund and is in effect match-

ing funds of the federal government which never vests in the
Appellant and could never become a part of the Estate of the
Appellant unless:
(1)

The Appellant

should be eligible

for

retirement;

(2)

Survive to the age of retirement; and

(3)

Commenced to withdraw retirement funds; and

(4)

Use

up

first

had

as

earned

and

Appellant

the

accumulated

retirement

monies

funds,

which

which would

the
be

namely, the sum of $15,681.95; and
(5)

After

to

the

use

of

the

sum of $15,681.95,

the

. Appellant would then be drawing against general governmental
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

funds, which funds at
amount

equal

tional

sum

retirement

the inception of his retirement is an

to his earned retirement
matched

by

funds would,

tionally supplemented

the

funds,

government

to

the

after being used up,

from general

and the addiAppellant's

then be addi-

funds of the retirement

fund without any consideration of the actual earned retirement funds of the Appellant.
The testimony on Page 5 of Appellant's Brief quotes the
retirement officer of Hill Air Force Base who stated:
The husband would have exhausted what
he's paid into the fund after he retires,
in about 2 1/2, 3 years at the most.
The Appellant's Brief sets forth on Page 4 thereof, the
admission that the husband had an earned retirement fund in
the amount of $15,681.95, which constituted the total deduct ion made from the pay to the husband during the course of
his employment
there

at Hill

Air Force Base.

As

to these funds

is no argument or contest by the Appellant that they

are not vested funds and an admission by the Appellant that
they should be considered as part of the retirement funds.
The argument of the Appellant before this Court in its
previous brief was,
band 1 s

$15, 681. 95

that

for

the

government

matches

bookkeeping purposes,

the hus-

with an addi-

tional sum of $15,581.95, or whatever funds may be in existence by the husband at the time he should elect retirement,
and

that

these additional

sets up as a credit

funds which the retirement funds

to the husband is a sum in addition to
4
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the earned sum which the Appellant would have at the time of
retirement,

and

these

additional

funds are established by

the retirement fund only for bookkeeping purposes, but at no
time

do

these

additional

matching

funds

vest

in

the

Appellant.
If

the

retirement,
entitled

Appellant

should

the only funds

to,

would be

become

demised,

prior

to

that he or his estate would be

the

funds which he earned and had

vested in him, which is namely the amount he contributed in
the sum of $15,681.95.

The additional matching funds of the

government are never vested in him, or could never be considered his property at any time as is illustrated by the
dialogue between counsel and the retirement fund expert witness which stated as follows:
Counsel:

When is the earliest time he
would be eligible to draw upon
his· share and the Federal
Governments shar~?

Witness:

Well, Sir, he really doesn't,
he really doesn't draw from
both.
The amount of money he
has in the retirement fund
does not have any bearing on
what
he
would
get
under
retirement monthly annuity.
The only value of what he has
in the retirement fund is for
Income Tax purposes or Dea th
Benefits purposes. (T-76)

In

the

instant

matter

before

the

Court,

the

issue

before this Court is whether or not the Court can take into
consideration

the

future

retirement

funds of

the husband

5
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which are not accrued by him,

and whether or not an amount

of

that

monthly

retirement

funds

he

would

draw,

if he

survived, after he has used up his earned retirement funds,
are subject to be considered by the lower Court as an asset
of

the

the estate and deducted

from real assets as of the

time of the divorce.
In the instant matter before the lower Court, the Court
took the sum of the retirement

fund which had actually been

earned by the Appellant at the time of the divorce, namely
in the amount of $15,681.95, and awarded to the wife the sum
of $30,000.00 to equal the Appellant's retirement funds when
only $15,681.95 was vested

in the Appellant

and

the addi-

tional amount up to $30,000.00 would be monies that he would
receive only if he survived and retired and was able to use
up his vested amount

of $15,681.95,

and then survived and

was able to draw monthly retirement pay from that sum up to
and including $30,000.00.
This
(1978),

Court

cited

~rig_!~!:.!.

Utah Supreme Court,

dered on October 19,

~ng!~rt.

v.

576

P.2d 1274

in support of its opinion ren-

1979, and there is no disagreement as

to that opinion, and the awarding by the lower Court of the
vested

funds

parties.

of

$15,681.95

as

assets

possessed

by

the

But surely this Court did not state in that case,

nor intend that the future retirement pay of a party who is
forty-nine
deducted

(49)

from

the

years

of

current

age

would

marital

be

assets

considered

and

in an act ion of

divorce.
6
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It is submitted to this Court that the matter that was
appealed to this Court is a matter of great impact upon the
divorce laws of the State of Utah, and upon the division of
the assets and the estate of the parties seeking a divorce
and a division of

the

assets

of

the martial

estate

that

deals with contingent, unknown and speculative assets that
are

not

yet

vested

in

the

husband

at

the

time

of

the

divorce, and there is no way in which that sum can be determined, nor should be determined, and this Court has continuously held as in

~~~!~t! !~ ~ng!er!, iup£~.

of

state

the

marital

£oss~ss~~

is

by the parties".

based

upon

"all

that a division
of

the

assets

(Emphasis added)

The lower Court understood that it was raising an issue
that was new and that the case was worthy of appeal in that
it

had

a

assets of

vast

and

long-range

the parties

effect

in determining

in a divorce matter,

and

that

the
the

appeal by the Appellant to this Court was not of a frivolous
nature.
again

With
herein,

the

indulgence of

the

dialogue

the Court we will repeat

set

forth

on

Page 7

Appellant's Brief as follows:
Mr. Vlahos:

Your Honor, if I understand your Honors posit ion in reference to this
$5,000.00
lien,
it
is
based on some $15,ooo.oo

Tnar f~~ _s:ov~rnmenr-fi~~
Tnaf fie can1 1 touch, has

no- c-On t ror- over-.- has
never--seen:- raTner tnan
-wfiat The-parHes

. Tiikiiig

~an-~ave-!1g~f ~£~?------
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of

It

The Court:

Yes.
That's taken into
consideration.
I
want
that understood, so that
in case you do wantto
appeaT;- ana nave--thaT
~a T!~! .t~fff~, you- c an-ao
so.

Mr. Vlahos:

In other words, you are
basing
it
on
the
$15,000.00
he
has
no
control
over,
can't
touch, has never seen,
and he can never get it.

The Court:

That he can only get i f
he
lives
long
enough.

Mr. Vlahos:

Only

The Court:

Lives
draw.

Mr. Vlahos:

I take it the $175.00 per
child is based on his net
income
of
$880.00.
I
think that is what the
Court
made
a
finding.

The Court:

Yes.

is

further

submitted

if

he
long

OK.

lives.
enough

to

(Emphasis added.)
to

the Court

that

the amount

which the lower Court awarded as child support was excessive
and inequitable and was based upon the same kind of bias as
was evidenced by the Court in its creating a new concept of
what constitutes the marital estate,
Appellant

to appeal

to this Court.

thereby compelling the
The Court manifested a

clear abuse of discretion that was determined by this Court
in Mart iii.et t v. ~art!~~!!· 8 Ut.2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958),
wherein this Court stated:

8
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If there is such a serious inequity as
to manifest a clear abuse of discretion,
this court will make the modification
necesary to bring about a just result.
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that a divorce
case is equitable in nature, and that this Court may review
the

evidence

and

substitute

its Judgment

for that of the

trial court where it finds that in the division of property
or the awards of alimony and child support, that the division and award in the lower Court was unjust and inequitable
(Tso~!~~!~

and was an abuse of discretion.

v.

!souf~~!~·

14

Ut.2d 273, 382 P.2d 412 (1963)
If this Court finds that unknown, contingent and speculative future retirement income of the spouse cannot be considered as an existing asset at
divorce,

the time of the decree of

then it is submitted that there must be an entire

revamping of the award made in the lower Court, in that the
consideration by the

lower Court of the sum of $30,000.00,

instead of the actual retirement earned asset of the husband
in

the

sum of $15,681.95 of the figure which was used in

concluding the lien to be awarded to the husband as against
the home,
least

and

that

the Appellant would be entitled to at

the difference between

the actual

earned $15, 681. 95

retirement fund and the $30,000.00 sum •vhich the Court used
in its computations in considering the assets of the estate.

9
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POINT I I.
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF HEARING
WITH THE RIGHT TO ORAL ARGUUENT IF REQUESTED.

It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the Appellant did not

receive a notice of hearing in this entitled

matter and did not have an opportunity to make a request for
oral argument, and that such lack of notice of hearing is a
deprivation of due process of law,

in that the matter to be

heard before this Court was of great import, not only to the
present

Appellant

before

the

Court,

but

to

all

persons

involved in matters of divorce in the future in the State of
Utah, and that the Appellant was not given notice of hearing
and have the right

to oral argument, and had Appellant been

given not ice, would have elected to present the true issues
before the Court.

CONCLUSION

It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the Appellant

is entitled to a rehearing with an opportunity to the

Appellant to argue the specific issues before the Court, and
in

any

event

October 19,
the Court,

the

opinion

rendered

by

this

Court

of

1978 was not declaratory of the matter before
and

is of such great

substance and import that

this Court should grant a petition for rehearing, and allow
argument

before

the

Court

on

the

original

Brief
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of

the

Plaintiff and Respondent,

and

that

the Appellant requests

the opportunity of argument before the Court by this Pet ition for rehearing, and respectfully requests the opportunity

to be

allowed

to argue the matter before this Court.

Respectfully submitted by,
VLAHOS, KNOWLTON & PERKINS
BY ..

(~·~.~~.°E.'.'",:

....... .

PETE-N:-vt:iUioS:-..,.01=--=tfie-FTriii__ _
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401
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